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Abstract
In this project we are questioning whether or not we can talk of objective moral 
values without appealing to a god. We go through the ethical theories of 
Utilitarianism and Deontology and then analyses two writers; Sam Harris that 
argues for the existence of a secular objective morality and John Leslie Mackie 
that argues against an objective morality. We then discuss their views and ends 
up concluding that there can be no objective morals without the existence of 
consciousness, but as long as we are talking about human consciousness, it 
makes sense to talk about objective values. 
Danish Summary
I dette project stiller vi spørgsmålstegn ved hvorvidt der kan eksistere objektive 
moralske værdier uden at drage guder ind over. Vi starter ud med at gennemgå 
to centrale etiske teorier; Utilitarisme og Deontologi. Herefter analyserer vi to 
forfattere; Sam Harris der argumenterer for eksistensen af sekulær objektiv 
moral samt John Leslie Mackie der argumenterer for at der ikke kan eksistere en 
objektiv moral. Vi diskuterer herefter deres synspunkter og forsøger at binde 
dem sammen og konkluderer derved til sidst at der ikke eksisterer nogen 
objektive moralske værdier uden for den menneskelige bevidsthed, men at vi så 
længe vi taler om menneskets bevidsthed godt kan tale om objektive værdier.
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Introduction
Ethics and morality has a long history of attracting great minds. From Plato to 
Bentham to Kant and even to contemporary philosophers like Shelly Kagan, 
questions of right and wrong have been examined and explored in depth. 
Throughout history theologians like Thomas Aquinas has heavily influenced our 
thoughts on the questions of right and wrong. Religion too has heavily 
influenced the answers we give to these questions, and it is influencing them 
still today. We see this on the subject of gay marriage when religious people 
quotes the old testament: "If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a 
woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put 
to death; their blood shall be upon them." (KJBO: Leviticus 20:13) in order to 
show why it is wrong. We saw it in the U.S government funding policy towards 
stem cell research under the Bush administration. Even in 2013 Denmark we 
still have a law against blasphemy. 
The world however is changing. We live in societies in which many if not most 
of us do not want to see people prosecuted for being gay or for being born into 
the wrong religion. The european countries are getting increasingly 
multicultural, with people from all over the world settling down. If history has 
tought us anything, it is that when different cultures come together, it does not 
always happen peacefully. It seems therefor that we should have some interest in 
creating a country in which there is space for individual cultures and religions so 
as not to promote conflict. In Denmark we have Christians, both Catholics and 
Protestants. We have muslims, both Shia and Sunni. We have Hindus and 
Buddhists. We have Atheists and probably also people practicing all sorts of 
other more uncommon religions. If we are to succesfully live together in peace, 
it does not seem optimal to continue to define ourselves as living in a 'Christian 
nation'. Rather we should aim to become a secular nation, in which no particular 
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religion enjoys special rights. A nation in which the separation of church and 
state is total, and where our rules and laws are created from a source free of 
religious ideas. A nation like this seems better geared to survive when many 
different cultures and religions comes together. 
For many people however, ethics and morality is hard to talk about in a context 
where there is no God. This sceptic opinion could be formulated along these 
lines; 'Can we really say that something is intrinsically wrong if there is no God, 
is it not then just human opinion?'. It does seem like there is a point to this 
position. If there is no moral lawgiver and it is just our human opinion, then 
what is to stop us from changing our opinion? It does not seem like there can be 
any objective morals in that kind of system.
This is what we are going to investigate on the following pages in this paper. 
How we can talk morality and ethics without God in the equation. We will not 
be looking at the old philosophical giants, rather we will stand on the shoulders 
of those that has already been standing on the shoulders of these giants, and see 
what they see. We will then discuss this and end up with a suggestion of how we 
can use secular morality and ethics to create our modern societies. 
We will start out by looking at two of the great moral theories; Utilitarianism 
and Deontology, Yale professor Shelly Kagan will help us through those. We do 
this to create a framework in which we can analyse and talk about the ideas of 
Sam Harris and John Leslie Mackie. Both of them are talking about ethics and 
morality in a religion free environment, but have two different approaches to the 
subject.
6
Problem Statement
 The question that I am asking in this project is the following: Can objective 
moral values exists without appealing to a god?
Research questions:
– How does Sam Harris argue for a secular objective morality?
– Why does Mackie claim that there are no objective values?
– What kind of secular moral system could be build if we cannot appeal to 
divine commands like the ten commands?
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Dimension
This project lies within the dimension of Science and Philosophy because we are 
dealing with philosophical theories that are used in the analyses. Both 
Utilitarianism and Deontology are theories of the humanities that seeks to give 
us answers to ethical questions.
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Delimitation
Due to the short nature of a solo project, I was forced to give my attention to 
only a small part of the arguments of Sam Harris and John Leslie Mackie. 
Though I have tried to capture the core of both arguments and tried to bring 
them together to reach my conclusion, I am aware that the arguments could have 
been dealt with in more detail. Had this been a group project with a hundred 
pages, it could also have been interesting to bring in some of the religious 
counter arguments to secular morality.
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Project Technique Course
Reflections on writing a solo project
Because of unlucky circumstances in my first semester, I was not able to 
continue working with my group. Instead I had to postpone the project and go 
solo. The greatest difficulty has been to find time through a normal semester to 
write another project, with all the reading and researching that goes into it. The 
other great obstacle has been the lack of group members to read through the 
stuff and give their reflections on it.
I have tried to use a structure like the one my group in the second semester used 
with succes. That means that the project has been build up by a theory section 
that gives an overview and understanding of some of the ethical theories that has 
influenced the analyses. I then go on to the two analyses in which I work with 
two interesting texts that both argue ethics and morality from a secular 
perspective. It then follows naturally to discuss these texts and draw a 
conclusion from them.
In my third semester project I have written the theory sections, and since both 
the projects have roots in morality, I have been able to rewrite and use some of 
the material. I hope that the structure of the project has showed that I have 
learned the technique of writing a project sufficiently enough to pass the course. 
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Methods
We will start out by looking at and define the two moral theories of 
Utilitarianism and Deontology. We do this in order to create a framework in 
which we can better understand the arguments that we will see in the two 
analyses that will follow. After having analysed Harris' and Mackies arguments 
we will discuss them in order to identify their strongest points and then combine 
them in order to make our conclusion. 
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Theory
Utilitarianism
In his 1776 book 'A Fragment on Government' Jeremy Bentham famously 
wrote: "It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of 
right and wrong” (Bentham, 1776: Preface p. 2). This quote does an acceptable 
job of summing up the essence of the utilitarian idea. According to Shelly Kagan 
however, it is not entirely correct. He writes that: “It is the view that an act is 
right if and only if it leads to the greatest total amount of well-being.” (Kagan 
1998:61). From this it is to be understood that from a utilitarian perspective it is 
not necessarily the greatest amount of well-being when it is evenly distributed. 
As he goes on to say: “Utilitarianism simply directs us to perform the act that 
will result in the outcome with the greatest total amount of well-being, and this 
might be an outcome that benefits a few individuals a great deal, rather than 
many individuals very little each.” (Kagan 1998:62). This does not seem right 
from a socialist perspective though, in which we think it important that we have 
some lower standard for well-being that has to be met in order for a situation to 
be acceptable.
Utilitarianism of the kind that we will be looking at is a combination of two 
central moral ideas; Consequentialism and Welfare-Hedonism, for simplicity we 
will refer to it as welfarism from here on. 
Consequentialism focuses on the best possible outcome of a given act. Since the  
“goodness of outcomes is the only morally relevant factor in determining the 
status of a given act.” (Kagan 1998:60) everything is being meassured at the 
final result of the act. This is interesting because we can think up examples that 
seems counter-intuitive to us. Take for example this imaginary story where a 
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frustrated person shoots a random person in public, then the person who was 
shot actually turns out to be a terrorist carrying explosives on his way to a bus. 
Normally we would think of the shooter as doing something wrong. His intent 
was not to kill a terrorist, but to kill a random person. But because it is only the 
consequences that matter, what he did was actually a good action, because it 
stopped the terrorist from blowing up a school bus full of people. This does 
seem to suggest there there are some weaknesses to the theory, since we would 
still want to lock him up. This in turn could still be defended by appealing to the 
threat of him doing something similar in the future, and then the consequences 
would be better by putting him away. But even if this could be used as a 
solution, we are still left with the maybe greatest obstacle for a consequentialist, 
namely our inability to predict the future with a 100 percent certainty. In our 
everyday life, we need not concern ourselves with this though. If we have the 
option to save someone from a certain death, an example could be someone who 
is about to drown, we should still do it. As Kagan puts it: “Uncertainty need not 
lead to paralysis.” (Kagan 1998:62). 
Since consequentialism on its own is not really enough to become a moral 
theory, in that it only tells us to value consequences, but not which 
consequences, we still need something to suplement it to really get a theory of 
morality. This is where welfarism comes in.
Welfarism is the philosophical view that what really matters is well-being. Well-
being in turn can be seen as a sort of mathematical equation in which we 
subtract pain from pleasure. The end result is then the measurement between the 
two. Kagan puts it like this: “... well-being consists solely in the presence of 
pleasure and the absence of pain. Pleasure and pain are the only elements that 
directly constitute how well of a person is." (Kagan, 1998: 30). This description 
sounds about right. If one is in excruciating pain, it is not possible to value life 
in the same way as if one is not in excruciating pain. This provide us with a 
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simple tool to judge what is good and what is not good. On a personal level it is 
possible to be in a lot of pain, but still have a lot of good things in life. It also 
makes it possible to be in little or no pain, but still only experience a tiny bit of 
pleasure. So the amount of pain and the amount of pleasure for the individual is 
not important. What is important is what we get when we measure them against 
each other.
Though welfarism does a good job of determining what we ought to value, it 
does not help us in navigating the field of morality, and this is where 
consequentialism comes in. Together they complete a strong theory of morality 
in which we both get a clear understanding of how to determine what we should 
try to accomplish, while also instructing us in how we should seek to 
accomplish it, namely by seeking to get the best consequences possible.
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Deontology
Deontology is in direct opposition to Utilitarianism. Where utilitarianism thinks 
that the most relevant factor is the consequences, Deontology proposes other 
factors that are also relevant. This does not mean that consequences is of no 
importance in deontology, they are, but they are just not the only relevant factor.
Immanuel Kant wrote that: "Nothing in the world, indeed nothing even beyond 
the world, can possibly be conceived which could be called good without 
qualification except a good will" (Mertz Hsieh, 2003:1). Here we are first 
presented with one of the central notions of deontology. The intention itself is 
important. Where from the utilitarian and consequentialist perspective, the 
intention is of little importance, it is of great importance to the deontologist. We 
see this notion in practical terms in our law system, where intent plays an 
important role when determining the length of a punishment. We also have this 
very important notion of duties or obligations. As Mackie puts it: “it seeks to 
create a moral system build not round the notion of some goal that is to be 
attained but rather round the notions of rules or principles of action or duties or  
rights or virtues, or some combination of these” (Mackie, 1977:149). The idea 
here is that if we have the right notion or idea of which rules or duties we have, 
it becomes very easy to determine whether or not an act was right or wrong. We 
can easily think up situations where this fits our commonsense understanding of 
morality.  Imagine for example a situation where someone is in need of medical 
assistance. You dial 911 and then tries to help this person by giving her cardiac 
massage. Unfortunately we are not very good at this, and ends up fracturing 
several ribs. The ambulance was nearby and arrives shortly after, but we did not 
know that this would be the case. We are very unlucky though, the shattered 
bones have destroyed something within the body and the person ends up dying 
from internal bleedings. In retrospect, the consequences would have been better 
if we had just dialed 911 and then waited. But because we did not know when 
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the ambulance would arrive, we choose to try and help this person with the best 
of our intentions. Would we want to put this person in jail? It seems reasonable 
to suggest that most of us would say no. We do not want to punish someone for 
trying to help someone in an impossible situation. From a deontological 
viewpoint, it is easy to explain this. From a consequentialist it becomes harder, 
since his actions was wrong because they did not bring about the best 
consequences possible.
Deontology works with a set of constraints that are used as general guidelines of 
how we ought to act. These guidelines can be seen as duties or obligations and 
seems largely to be in sync with our commonsense morality. The main constraint 
is the constraint against doing harm. In his book Normative Ethics, Shelly 
Kagan tells a couple of interesting stories containing moral dilemmas. In the 
first one we follow Chuck. Chuck is on his way to his doctor for a routine check. 
Little does he know that the doctor has five patients that are going to die because 
they all need an organ transplant for five different organs. Unfortunately, none of 
them are tissue compatible. Chuck is however, and the doctor decides to chop 
him up and give the five other persons the organs that they needed (Kagan, 
1998:71). Chuck died to save five others. From a consequentialist viewpoint, 
this was the best possible consequence, since five got to live and only one got to 
die. But somehow, the actions of the doctor does not seem right to many of us. 
Surely it could not have been morally permissible to chop up poor Chuck. 
Deontologists explains this by appealing to a constraint against doing harm. It is 
because the doctor violates this constraint that his actions seems intuitively 
wrong to us. However, as we shall see on Kagans next story, it does seem like 
this constraint has some shortcomings.
In this classic story a trolley car is loose. It is racing down the tracks. If not 
stopped it will hit and kill five innocent bystanders. We are standing on the side 
of the track, infront of us is a switch that will change the trolleys direction down 
another track where only one innocent person is standing. If we hit the switch, 
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we will save five people but kill one (Kagan, 1998: 100). In this case, many of 
us would think it permissible to hit the switch. Kagan solves this by introducing 
a new constraint. The constraint against intending harm(Kagan, 1998: 101). In 
this case we can hit the switch with a clear conscience because we have no 
intention of harming anyone, we are simply trying to rescue the five. In the case 
of the doctor we intend to actively harm Chuck, whereas in this story, the death 
of the single unlucky individual is just an unfortunate side effect. Of course 
some of us might still think it wrong to hit the switch, as Kagan writes: “Some 
deontologists are quite prepared to accept this conclusion. They need not be 
bothered by the trolley problem at all.” (Kagan, 1998:101). What we should 
take from this is that depending on what we value, it can both be deemed moral 
and immoral to hit the switch from a deontological viewpoint. This shows one of 
the weaknesses of deontology, namely that if we have no clear source to tell us 
what our duties are, we do not have as clear an idea of what we ought to value, 
as we did when we looked at welfarism. Maybe this is why deontology seems to 
be so popular with Christian apologetics like William Lane Craig. If you have a 
divine lawbringer which laws cannot be questioned, you have a very strong 
narrative for a moral theory, if not it becomes somewhat more difficult.
As this paper seeks to investigate a source for ethics and morality that is not 
dependent on religion, we will be very careful in our examination of any kind of 
duties or obligations that might be proposed.
With this theoretical knowledge in our baggage, we will continue to look at the 
arguments for a secular objective morality. 
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Analyses
Sam Harris
In this analysis we take a close look at the claim that morality in makes sense 
through conscious minds, and that facts about this can be understood 
objectively. We look at well-being and how it should form our theory of 
morality.
Sam Harris is an American citizen. He has a B.A. degree in philosophy from 
Stanford  University and a Ph.D. in cognitive neuroscience from the University 
of California. He is an outspoken atheist and have written several books about 
the harm of religion. His view on morality is therefor very secular and free of 
religious dogma. He argues that the questions of morality can be understood and 
examined in not only philosophical terms, but also in scientific terms through 
our growing understanding of the brain. 
He makes the claim that morality only exist because there are conscious minds. 
If we imagined a universe without life, completely made up of suns, stone and 
gas planets, then it would not make sense to talk about morality. Therefor 
"questions about values - about meaning, morality, and life's larger purpose - 
are really questions about the well-being of conscious creatures. Values 
therefore, translate into facts that can be scientifically understood;"(Harris, 
2010: 11-12). He then goes on to specify that his argument rests on a very 
simple premise: "human well-being entirely depends on events in the world and 
on states of the human brain. Consequently, there must be scientific truths to be 
known about it."(Harris, 2010:13).
It seems hard to argue with this claim. Most of us can agree that morality has 
something to do with how we interact with other minds in this world. Almost all 
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of our moral concerns has to do with how we treat other people. The constraint 
against doing harm in Deontology is one example, the notion of well-being in 
welfarism is another. In a lifeless universe it would not make sense to talk about 
morality, and even if we imagine a universe with life like bacteria or primitive 
primates, it would not make more sense. This is evident in that most of us are 
not concerned with prosecuting snakes or bears when they attack humans, it is 
simply absurd to talk about moral responsibility without a conscious mind. It 
therefor seems that we need consciousness in order to explain why morality 
matters.
If consciousness is the key term, surely the brain is of key interest to us. As far 
as we know, consciousness cannot exist without the brain. Some people might 
try to point to stories of ghosts, but for the purpose of this paper we will ignore 
such superstition that has not been demonstrated to exist.
We know that consciousness originates somewhere in the brain, and we know 
that the brain is affected by what is happening in the world. Through scanners 
we can see that different centers of the brain is being active depending on what 
we are doing and what is happening around us. Any actions towards us will then 
have some effects on our brain, and by understanding these effects we can say 
something about what effects is desirable and what effects is undesirable. This 
argument should hold as long as we can agree that morality has something to do 
with our consciousness and that how we interact with the world has some 
influence over that consciousness. 
Harris then goes on to imagine the world of morality as a moral landscape where 
the "(...) peaks correspond to the heights of potential well-being and whose 
valleys represent the deepest possible suffering" (Harris 2010:18). What Harris 
is doing here is try to map out the possibilities of human experiences in a clear 
and distinct way where we intuitively can identify where on this landscape we 
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should aim to be. It is possibly not an exaggeration to say that none of us would 
prefer to live in the deepest valleys. 
This argument is essentially an utilitarian argument with focus on welfarism. 
This landscape is not very different from saying that we want to measure how 
well of a person is by using the hedonistic idea of pleasure versus pain. In this 
idea we subtract the amount of pain that we are experiencing from the amount of 
pleasure that we are experiencing (Kagan, 1998: 31). The result we then end up 
with corresponds to our position on the moral landscape. Harris' 
accomplishment by creating this landscape in our minds is that it is easy to see 
why we should seek to come closer to the peaks and try to get away from the 
valleys. Most of us would agree that we would like our lives to consist of as 
much pleasure as possible and as little pain as possible. 
This does not mean that there is only one way to reach a peak. Harris stresses 
this point when he writes: “I'm not suggesting that we will necessarily discover 
one right answer to every moral question or a single best way for human beings 
to live. Some questions may admit of many answers, each more or less 
equivalent. However, the existence of multiple peaks on the moral landscape 
does not make them any less real or worthy of discovery.” (Harris, 2010: 19). 
This notion opens up for a moral system that does not try to dictate everyone 
into doing the same actions. As long as the consequences are about equally 
good, different actions would be moral permissible. This is seems however to be 
a weaker position than what we generally expect from consequentalists theories 
since we would normally say that the only right action is the one with the best 
overall consequences. Harris' model then opens up for a more casual way to 
engage morality. Still there is no doubt that the argument in its core is a 
utilitarian one.
Harris' background as a neuroscientist becomes clear when he says that: “If 
there are objective truths to be known about human well-being – if kindness, for 
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instance, is generally more conducive to happiness than cruelty is – then science  
should one day be able to make very precise claims about which of our 
behaviors and uses of attention are morally good, which are neutral, and which 
are worth abandoning.” (Harris, 2010:20). Here he abandons a purely 
philosophical discussion on morality in order to show that facts on human well-
being will someday be something than can be realised directly from observing 
the brain. 
His claims that science one day can make precise claims does not seem illogical 
in light of our growing understanding of the brain. If we in the future can tell 
what parts of the brain that are active when we are experiencing good things and 
what parts are active when we are experiencing bad things, then it seems entirely 
possible that a combination of social sciences and neuroscience could make very 
strong claims on how we should raise our kids or how we should treat our 
colleagues. In light of this it might be worth considering in the future to bridge 
the gap between humanistic sciences and natural sciences.
One of the opposing arguments of this understanding of an objective morality 
could be that some people might like to experience some amount of pain. 
Therefor we cannot say as a truth fact that pain is necessarily a bad thing. 
Though it might be right that some of us like pain, it might not actually be the 
pain it self that we like. Some extreme sports like running a marathon or 
participating in ultimate fighting matches surely has painful consequences, but 
what most people enjoy is more likely the release of natural drugs in our brain 
that gives us pleasure as a reward. 
Harris overcomes the argument by imagining two different lives, a bad one and 
a good one. The bad life could be described as the worst possibly missery for a 
person. The story that he tells is of a young widow that has lived her entire life 
in a civil war. Today she has experienced her seven-year-old daughter being 
raped and dismembered before her own eyes by her fourteen-year-old son that 
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was forced to do it by soldiers. She is then forced to run for her life. This day 
might be the worst day she has ever experienced, by it is not unlike other days. 
Even the luckiest person she has known has not experienced anything better 
than what she is now experiencing (Harris, 2010: 28). It seems legitimate to 
claim that no sane person could claim that living this kind of life equals the 
happy life. 
In contrast his example of the good life in which we hear of a woman that is 
married to a loving. Intelligent, and charismatic man. Both of them have great 
careers that are intellectually stimulating and financially rewarding. Through 
most of her life she has had the opportunity to devote herself to activities that 
brings her emmense personal satisfaction. If asked she would answer that she 
could not imagine a better life (Harris, 2010: 29). In this example we would be 
justified in saying that this person is living a good life. The contrast between the 
two lives is so great that we intuitively can see what life we would prefer to live 
ourself. It is very hard to argue that it is only a subjective opinion to prefer the 
good life, it seems that we can objectively conclude that the bad life is worse 
than the good life. If we can conclude this we should also be able to grant that 
there are objective truths to be known about morality, and that it is therefore 
legitimate to research the subject of objective morality in order to create 
societies that maximises human well-being.
It could be argued that anyone that fails to see the difference between the good 
and the bad life is not worth taking serious in a debate about moral philosophy, 
just as we do not take a person that thinks that being physically ill is better than 
being physically well serious in a discussion about medicine. The existence of 
such persons does not hinder us in improving our medical understanding, and it 
should not hinder us in improving our understanding of morality, as Harris 
points out “Despite 150 years of working at it, we still can't convince a majority 
of the Americans that evolution is a fact. Does this mean biology isn't a proper 
science?” (Harris, 2010: 55).
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John Leslie Mackie
In this analysis we take a close look at the objection to objective morality. We 
then go on to look at what kind of moral system John Leslie Mackie proposes 
that we follow. 
John Leslie Mackie was an Australian philosopher. He teached at several 
universities including the University of Sidney, the University of York and 
Oxford University. He has written several books on ethics and morality 
including the book that we are looking at Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.
Mackie starts the book by making the very bold claim: "There are no objective 
values" (Mackie, 1977:15). He then goes on to specify and says that "The claim 
that values are not objective, are not part of the fabric of the world, is meant to 
include not only moral goodness, which might be most naturally equated with 
moral values or disvalues – rightness and wrongness, duty, obligation, an 
action's being rotten and contemptible, and so on. It also includes non-moral 
values, notably aesthetic ones, beauty and various kinds of artistic merit." 
(Mackie, 1977: 15). Here he goes directly for the normative ethics, especially 
deontology. By saying that things like duties and obligations are not part of the 
fabric of the world, he is essentially saying that any try to point to a 
commonsense understanding of what duties we have, is a fallacy because they 
are subjective values. They might be shared by many, but they have no intrinsic 
value. We see this more clearly when we look at the later part of the quote in 
which he includes non-moral values like beauty. There is nothing that is 
objectively beauty, we might look at something and think it beautiful, but that is 
only our subjective reaction too it. This claim seems right when it comes to 
things like beauty. What we find beautiful today is not necessarily what later 
generations are going to find beautiful. 
23
An example, when we look at history, could be how our perception of skin 
colour has changed. At different points in history a mantra like; the whiter the 
skin the better, was true. But today many of us associate a white skin with an 
unhealthy lifestyle and a sun browned skin with a healthy one. The same 
argument could be made for many moral questions like the one about slavery. In 
the 17th century it was not generally considered unethical to own other human 
beings, but today, many if not most of us, would condemn such a practice. The 
question is whether or not the observation that morality has changed is enough 
to dismiss objective morals, it does not seem to follow. It is however a strong 
argument against commonsense morality as a whole, and it does seem to follow 
that we should not be too willing to trust our intuitions. 
Mackie makes a distinction when he talks about morality between what he calls 
a first order view and a second order view. The first order view of morality 
might be defined as normative morals. In this class we see the moral judgements 
that we make on day to day basis, like condemning someone for robbing a bank 
or beating their wife. In the second order view we take a step back and look at 
the source of these first order views, and we can ask questions like; are they 
simply attitudes and policies, or is they something more? (Mackie, 1977: 16).
It seems that what Mackie is really concerned about when it comes to the 
objectivity of morals is not the first order view, but rather the second order view. 
He writes that: "How could anyone deny that there is a difference between a 
kind action and a cruel one, or that a coward and a brave man behave 
differently in the face of danger? Of course, this is undeniable; but it is not the 
point. The kinds of behaviour to which moral values and disvalues are ascribed 
are indeed part of the furniture of the world, and so are the natural, descriptive, 
differences between them; but not, perhaps, their differrences in value. It is a 
hard fact that cruel actions differ from kind ones, and hence what we can learn, 
as in fact we all do, to distinguish them fairly well in practice, and to use the 
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words 'cruel' and 'kind' with fairly descriptive meanings; but is it an equally 
hard fact that actions which are cruel in such a descriptive sense are to be 
condemned?" (Mackie, 1977: 16-17). This was a long quote but it does a 
remarkable job of summing up his position. While he is agreeing that we can 
look at actions and accurately describe them because they are 'part of the 
furniture of the world' he is questioning whether or not that means that we can 
condemn the actions. From this quote it seems quite clear that his objection to 
objectivity is really concerned with the second order view and not the first order. 
This points back to the earlier quote about the notion of something being a 
fabric of the world. A cruel act is just that, a cruel act – but in Mackie's view, 
while undesirable, it does not seem to follow that there is anything intrinsically 
wrong about it. 
Mackie continues his assault on objectivity when he writes that: "To say that 
there are objective values would not be to say merely that there are some things 
which are valued by everyone, nor does it entail this. There could be agreement 
in valuing even if valuing is just something that people do, even if this activity is  
not further validated. Subjective agreement would give intersubjective values, 
but intersubjectivity is not objectivity." (Mackie, 1977: 22). His point here is 
crucial to defeat the commonsense notion of objective morality. Less than a 
thousand years ago most of the worlds population was in agreement that the 
world was flat and at the center of the universe, obviously those people were 
wrong. Just as agreement in facts does not make them true, agreement on what 
should be valued in moral terms does not make them objectively true. What is 
really at stake here, is many of the premises for the moral theories. According to 
utilitarianism we should value pleasure over pain – but according to Mackie this 
is not necessarily true. If we investigate this premise through his second order 
view of morality, it would not be enough even if all sane persons in the world 
thought that we should value it. We should not let ourselves become confused 
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though. Mackie is not necessarily saying that we should not value pleasure over 
pain, he is just pointing out that we cannot claim it to be an objective fact that 
we should do so. 
If mackie is right that we cannot reason through our commonsense morality that 
something is objectively true, even if we all agree to it, it then becomes difficult 
to see how we could ever make objective claims. Mackie himself writes that 
"The difficulty of seeing how values could be objective is a fairly strong reason 
for thinking that they are not so" (Mackie, 1977: 24). Mackie is right, without 
invoking commands by a god it seems hard for us humans to justify objective 
morals in the way that Mackie is talking about them. 
Does this mean that it impossible to talk about objectivity in any situation? 
According to Mackie the answer is no. We can still make objective evaluations 
as long as they are relative to standards. These standards are something we 
ourselves must construct. He gives us an example from a diving contest. If one 
diver's performance better measures up to the standards that we have agreed 
upon, it would be unjust to give the prize to the diver that performed worse 
(Mackie, 1977: 26). But even so it still "leaves open the question whether there 
is any objective requirement to do what is just(...)" (Mackie, 1977: 27). It seems 
that we here are left with a practical question, and maybe this is really the point 
that Mackie is getting at in his book. 
We cannot convincingly defend any of the objective truths that we might be 
taking for granted, we therefor have to create a practical morality in which we 
invent right and wrong ourselves, without lying to us self about the objectivity 
of it. This might be what Mackie is trying to explain when he writes that "(...) 
the lack of objective values is not a good reason for abandoning subjective 
concern or for ceasing to want anything." (Mackie, 1977: 34). The fact that 
there are no objective values that can be found by looking for them only makes 
it that more important that we do not abandon our 'subjective concern' for living 
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in a moral world. We still need ethics and moral guidelines, and if we cannot get 
them by looking for them, we need to get them by thinking them up ourselves. 
Thus it seems that we must conclude that on the topic of second order objective 
morality we need to take the view of moral scepticism, and that it should take 
the form of an "(...) error theory, admitting that a belief in objective values is 
built into ordinary moral thought and language, but holding that this ingrained 
belief is false." (Mackie, 1977: 48-49). 
The type of moral system that Mackie then wants to construct is free of 
objective morality, but seems based on a practical take on morality. His "(...) 
hope is that concrete moral issues can be argued out without appeal to any 
mythical objective values or requirements or obligations or transcendental 
necessities, but also without appeal to a fictitiously unitary and measurable 
happiness or to invalid arguments that attempt to establish the general 
happiness as a peculiarly authoritative end." (Mackie, 1977: 199). It should be 
noted here that even though he will name himself as a utilitarian, he does not 
accept the claim that hapiness is the authoritative end goal, nor that we can 
accurately measure happiness as it is generally proposed by most utilitarians. 
This does not mean that happiness is not something worth looking for when we 
argue what the right action is, but it is not enough. He goes on to explain that: 
"No doubt my approach could be called in a very broad sense, a rule utilitarian 
one, since any specific development of it would be based on some conception of 
the flourishing of human life, but it would be utiltarianism without its 
characteristic fictions, and it would be not just rule-utilitarianism but a rule-
right-duty-disposition utilitarianism." (Mackie, 1977: 199-200).
This need to put distance between his stand on morals, and normal utilitarianism 
seems to come from one of the classic problems with utilitarianism, namely the 
problem that comes up when we can sanction horrible actions because the 
consequences might be better. Mackie specifically mentions examples where we 
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can justify killing innocent people, invade their rights, torture political 
opponents, cheat, and betray trust. His rule utilitarianism is able to say that those 
actions are wrong "(...) because the general performance of acts of each of these  
classes would plainly have a very bad effect on the general hapiness." (Mackie, 
1977: 137). By including duties into his moral scheme we get some of the 
strengths from deontological ethics where we have general duties that helps us 
navigate our actions through our everyday lives, but these duties are no longer 
based on objective moral truths or commands, but rather on an understanding of 
what generally gives us the best consequences. 
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Discussion
At first glance it seems that Sam Harris and J.L. Mackie disagrees about 
something as essential as the objectivity of moral standards. According to 
Harris, to talk about morality is to talk about effects on human consciousness. If 
there is no consciousness, then it does not make sense to talk about morality.
It is hard to see how we can actually argue against this, is there a way that we 
can imagine a world in which there is still morals without consciousness? It is 
hard to see how, if it is supposed to meet Mackie's definition of being a part of 
the fabric of the world. It seems that when we talk about good or bad, we have 
to talk about how actions influence human minds. It is the view of Harris that 
we can objectively say that holding a flame against someones skin is a bad thing 
because we are clearly not maximising human flourishing. That is not to say that 
there is something intrinsically wrong with holding a flame against someones 
hand, we can at least in theory, though it might not be scientifically plausible, 
imagine another species made out of some hot substance that enjoys the flame 
against their hands because it feels cooling compared to their own body 
temperature. It is objectively wrong only because we understand it through our 
consciousness, and we humans experiences flames against our skin as a very 
painful event. This view of objective morality does not fit in with the definition 
of the second order morality that Mackie has defined, so in that sense it does not 
seem like we can say that objective morals exist, but for the purpose of creating 
a society with rules and laws that are not based on religious writings but on 
objective moral values, it might not be true that we should discard objective 
morals after all. 
If we grant Mackie that there can be no objective morals when seen as an 
incorporated fabric of the world, it does not necessarily follow that we cannot 
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talk about an objective morality with regard to human beings. This kind of 
system might require changes during the course of human evolution, because it 
would be based upon an understanding of the human mind that might change in 
the future, but it seems in theory to be possible. To accept objective morals in 
regards to humans and not as being part of the universe, we would have to 
accept that there are truths to be known about human experiences, and these 
truths would in some way have to affect our quality of life.
Harris told us two stories about a good and a bad life. It is hard to argue that 
there is not a huge difference between the too. It does therefor not seem bold to 
suggest that if asked, most if not all of us would choose the good over the bad 
life. However, Mackie maked it perfectly clear that even if every human being 
should agree on this, it would not be possible to make objective claims based 
upon it, only intersubjective claims. The fact that we can recognise a desirable 
life over an undesirable life can therefor not be attributed to it being an objective 
fact, but to create a practical moral system, it might not need too.  
Today there is no doubt that the human experience is happening in the brain, 
therefor it seems obvious that to understand it, we have to understand the brain 
better. Harris has had 33 ekstra years of neuroscientific research to base his 
understanding of the brain on compared to Mackie. In these years we have 
learned a lot of how the brain works as a chemical machine, and we know that 
certain chemicals can alter our perception of things. A secular theory of morality 
would have to take the increasing knowledge of the brain into account when 
trying to answer the questions of right and wrong.
It seems like the kind of moral system that both Mackie and Harris are 
proposing might not be that incompatible. Mackie defines himself as a rule-
right-duty-disposition utilitarianist because this composition can create a moral 
system with the best parts of deontological and utilitarianist morals. His version 
combines an understanding of the importance of consequences with a safeguard 
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against some of the more horrible actions that might be sanctioned because of 
his focus on the rule-right-duty part. Harris though utilitarianist in his core does 
not adhere to the totalistic view of consequentalism in that he does not take it as 
a requirement that only the action that brings about the single best consequence 
should be deemed moral. Rather he argues for an open-minded understanding of 
ethics with room for different cultural  aspects as long as these provide more or 
less equivalent results. In practical terms this would mean that we could set up a 
system with utilitarianism at its core, but with notions like obligations and duties 
to help us navigate in this moral landscape that Harris proposes. Because the 
claim to objectivity from Harris is clearly a first order view that exists only as 
long as there is the possibility of human experiences through our consciousness, 
it does not directly violate Mackie's objection to objectivity. Through Mackie's 
text it seems that he is primarily objecting to what could be called the religious 
understanding of objectivity in which it is part of the 'design'.
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Conclusion 
We cannot confirm the existence of objective moral values that exists 
independent of consciousness, as it is not at all evident that it would make sense 
to talk about ethics without the possibility of conscious beings to experience it. 
We can however talk about objective values in regard to human experiences. By 
realising the range of possible human experiences it becomes clear that some are 
objectively better, and some are objectively worse. By combining 
neuroscientific research and humanistic sciences it would be possible to create a 
moral system that effectively guides societies towards creating environments in 
which human beings are more likely to flourish. 
We can therefor conclude that in practical terms it makes sense to talk about 
objective values, even in secular societies. 
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